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Abstract. In this paper the WASABI1 Affect Simulation Architecture
is introduced, in which a virtual human’s cognitive reasoning capabil-
ities are combined with simulated embodiment to achieve the simula-
tion of primary and secondary emotions. In modeling primary emotions
we follow the idea of “Core Affect” in combination with a continuous
progression of bodily feeling in three-dimensional emotion space (PAD
space), that is only subsequently categorized into discrete emotions. In
humans, primary emotions are understood as onto-genetically earlier
emotions, which directly influence facial expressions. Secondary emo-
tions, in contrast, afford the ability to reason about current events in
the light of experiences and expectations. By technically representing
aspects of their connotative meaning in PAD space, we not only as-
sure their mood-congruent elicitation, but also combine them with facial
expressions, that are concurrently driven by the primary emotions. An
empirical study showed that human players in the Skip-Bo scenario judge
our virtual human MAX significantly older when secondary emotions are
simulated in addition to primary ones.
1 Introduction and Motivation
Researchers in the field of Embodied Conversational Agents (ECAs) [8, 29] build
anthropomorphic systems, which are employed in different interaction scenarios,
that afford communicative abilities of different style and complexity. As these
agents comprise an increasing number of sensors as well as actuators together
with an increase in expressive capabilities, they need to be able to recognize and
produce social cues in face-to-face communication.
One factor in social interaction is the ability to deal with the affective di-
mension appropriately. Therefore researchers in the growing field of “Affective
Computing” [27] discuss ways to derive human affective states from all kinds of
intrusive and non-intrusive sensors. With regard to the expressive capabilities
of embodied agents the integration of emotional factors influencing bodily ex-
pressions is argued for. These bodily expressions include, e.g., facial expression,
body posture, and voice inflection and all of them must be modulated in concert
to synthesize coherent emotional behavior.
1 [W]ASABI [A]ffect [S]imulation for [A]gents with [B]elievable [I]nteractivity
With the WASABI architecture we present our attempt to exploit different
findings and conceptions of emotion psychology, neurobiology, and developmen-
tal psychology in a fully-implemented computational architecture. It is based
on the simulation of an emotion dynamics in three-dimensional emotion space,
which has proven beneficial to increase the lifelikeness and believability of our
virtual human MAX in two different interaction scenarios [3]. With this emo-
tion dynamics simulation, however, we are limited to a class of rather simple
emotions, that are similar to Damasio’s conception of primary emotions. In the
WASABI architecture we use our agent’s cognitive reasoning abilities to model
the mood-congruent elicitation of secondary emotions as well.
In the following section the psychological as well as neurobiological back-
ground is described with respect to the distinction of primary as well as sec-
ondary emotions. Subsequently we give an overview of related work in the field
of Affective Computing. The WASABI architecture is presented in Section 3. We
explain how nine primary emotions together with three secondary emotions—
namely the prospect-based emotions hope, fears-confirmed, and relief —were in-
tegrated in such a way that their mood-congruent elicitation can be guaranteed.
We conclude by discussing results of a first empirical study on the effect of
secondary emotion simulation in the Skip-Bo card game scenario.
2 Background and Related Work
We will first introduce the psychological and neurobiological background before
an overview of related work in affective human-computer interaction is given.
2.1 Psychological and Neurobiological Background
According to [33] the “psychological construct” labeled emotion can be broken
up into the component of cognitive appraisal, the physiological component of
activation and arousal, the component of motor expression, the motivational
component, and the component of subjective feeling state. We follow the dis-
tinction of a cognitive appraisal component and a physiological component in
the computational simulation of affect.2 We also account for the motivational
component, because our agent’s reasoning capabilities are modeled according
to the belief-desire-intention approach to modeling rational behavior [30]. We
further believe, that we first need to realize the dynamic interaction between a
cognitive and a physiological component before we can tackle the question of
how to computationally realize a subjective feeling state.
Recently, psychologists started to investigate “unconscious processes in emo-
tions” [35] and Ortony at al. discuss levels of processing in “effective functioning”
by introducing a distinction between “emotions” and “feelings” [26]. They un-
derstand feelings as “readouts of the brain’s registration of bodily conditions and
2 The motor expression component has been realized as well, but not in the scope of
this paper (see [3] for details).
changes” whereas “emotions are interpreted feelings” [26, p. 174] and propose
three different levels of information processing [26], which are compatible with
Scherer’s three modes of representation [35].
According to Ortony and colleagues, lower-levels have to contribute in order
to experience “hot” emotions such that “cold, rational anger” could be solely
the product of the cognitive component “without the concomitant feeling com-
ponents from lower levels.” [26, p. 197] A purely primitive feeling of fear, on the
contrary, also lacks the necessary cognitive elaboration to become a full-blown
emotion. These psychological considerations are compatible with LeDoux’s dis-
tinction of a low and a high road of fear elicitation in the brain [20] and Damasio’s
assumption of bodily responses causing an “emotional body state” [9, p. 138]
that is subsequently analyzed in the thought process.
Two classes of emotions Damasio’s neurobiological research on emotions
suggests the distinction of at least two classes of emotions, namely, primary and
secondary emotions [9].
The term “primary emotions” [9] refers to emotions which are supposed to be
inate. They developed during phylogeny to support fast and reactive response
behavior in case of immediate danger, i.e. basic behavioral response tenden-
cies like “flight-or-fight” behaviors. In humans, however, the perception of the
changed bodily state is combined with the object that initiated it resulting in a
“feeling of the emotion” with respect to that particular object [9, p. 132]. Pri-
mary emotions are also understood as a prototypical emotion types which can
already be ascribed to one year old children [10].
They are comparable to the concept of “Core Affect” [32, 14], which is based
on the assumption that emotions cannot be identified by distinct categories from
the start. “Core Affect” is represented in two-dimensional emotion space of Plea-
sure/Valence and Arousal, which is sometimes extended by a third dimension
[37, 31, 17] labeled “Control/Dominance/Power” of connotative meaning. Fur-
thermore, Wundt claims that any emotion can be characterized as a continuous
progression in such three-dimensional emotion space [37]. The degree of Dom-
inance not only describes the experienced “control” over the emotion or the
situational context, but can also belong to an agent’s personality traits. The
three-dimensional abstract emotion space is often referred to as PAD space.
Secondary emotions like “relief” or “hope” are assumed to arise from higher
cognitive processes, based on an ability to evaluate preferences over outcomes and
expectations. Accordingly, secondary emotions are acquired during ontogenesis
through learning processes in the social context.
Damasio uses the adjective “secondary” to refer to “adult” emotions, which
utilize the machinery of primary emotions by influencing the acquisition of “dis-
positional representations”, which are necessary for the elicitation of secondary
emotions. These “acquired dispositional representations”, however, are believed
to be different from the “innate dispositional representations” underlying pri-
mary emotions. Furthermore, secondary emotions influence bodily expressions
through the same mechanisms as primary emotions.
2.2 Related Work
El-Nasr et al. [13] present FLAME as a formalization of the dynamics of 14
emotions based on fuzzy logic rules, that includes a mood value, which is contin-
uously calculated as the average of all emotion intensities to provide a solution to
the problem of conflicting emotions being activated at the same time. The idea
of expectations is realized in FLAME by means of learning algorithms based on
rewards and punishments. Although it was not integrated into the simulation of
a virtual human, the mutual influence of emotion and mood is quite similar to
the conception of emotion dynamics in the WASABI architecture.
Marsella and Gratch [23] focus with their “EMA” model of emotions on the
dynamics of emotional appraisal. They also argue for a mood value as an ad-
dend in the calculation of otherwise equally activated emotional states following
the idea of mood-congruent emotions. Their framework for modeling emotions
is the first fully implemented, domain-independent architecture for emotional
conversational agents.
Marinier and Laird [21] aim to combine the work of Gratch and Marsella [23]
with the findings of Damasio [9]. In later publications [22], however, Damasio’s
work is less central and they follow the ideas of Scherer [34]. Their central idea
of “appraisal frames” is based on the EMA model [23] and eleven of Scherer’s
sixteen appraisal dimensions are modeled for integration in the Soar cognitive
architecture. They distinguish an “Active Appraisal Frame”, which is the result
of a momentary appraisal of a given event, from a “Perceived Appraisal Frame”,
which results from the combination of the actual mood and emotion frames.
Thereby, they claim to account for Damasio’s distinction between emotion and
feeling—similarly to the conception underlying the WASABI architecture.
Although Andre´ et al. [1] start with the distinction of primary and secondary
emotions, it is not taken up in their later publications, e.g. [16]. Gebhard [15],
recently, uses the PAD space to derive a mood value from emotions resulting
from OCC-based appraisal. Three-dimensional emotion spaces similar to PAD
space are also used to drive the sociable robot “Kismet” [7] or the humanoid
robot WE-4RII [19].
3 The WASABI Architecture
The WASABI architecture conceptualized here builds upon previous work on
the simulation of emotion dynamics for the virtual human MAX [2] that has
proven to support the agent’s believability in two different interaction scenarios
[3, 6]. It was, however, limited to the simulation of primary emotions.
Accordingly, the WASABI architecture [5] combines bodily emotion dynamics
with cognitive appraisal in order to simulate infant-like primary emotions as
well as cognitively elaborated, more adult secondary emotions. In the following
a suitable specification of the different concepts emotion and mood is derived
from the theoretical background presented above.
Emotions are understood as current states with a specific quality and intensity,
which are the outcome of complex neurophysiological processes for communica-
tion. The processes include neural activity of the brain as well as physiological
responses of the body. One gets aware of one’s emotions in two cases: (1) if their
awareness likelihood w exceeds a certain threshold (cf. Section 3.3) or (2) if one
concentrates on the underlying processes by means of introspection.
Emotions can be classified into primary and secondary ones, but every emo-
tion has either positive or negative valence of a certain value and compared to
mood an emotion lasts significantly less long. The differences between primary
and secondary emotions are conceptualized as follows:
– Secondary emotions are based on more complex data structures than primary
ones. Accordingly, only some general aspects of secondary emotions (such as
their valence components) are represented in PAD space.
– The appraisal of secondary emotions depends much more on the situational
and social context than that of primary emotions. Thus, secondary emotions
are more dependent on the agent’s cognitive reasoning abilities.
– The releasers of secondary emotions might be learned based on the history of
primary emotions in connection with memories of events, agents and objects.
– The agent’s facial expressions of primary emotions (cf. Figure 1) may ac-
company secondary emotions.
– Secondary emotions also modulate the agent’s simulated embodiment.
Mood is understood as a background state with a much simpler affective quality
than emotions. It is assumed that bodily responses influence the development of
mood over time and that a mood is a diffuse valenced state, i.e. the experiencing
individual is likely to be unable to give a clear reason for his or her current
mood. Emotions have a fortifying or alleviating effect on an individual’s mood,
which, in turn, influences the elicitation of emotions [24]. A mood’s duration is
in general longer than that of emotions.
3.1 Nine Primary Emotions
Primary emotions (PE) are inborn affective states, which are triggered by reflexes
in case of potentially harmful stimuli. They result in fast, reactive behavioral
responses and, thus, are quite similar to the concept of proto-affect proposed
by [26]. According to developmental psychology, young children express their
(primary) emotions directly, because they did not yet internalize this process as
in the case of adults [18].
In our previous realization of emotion dynamics [2] this direct expression of
primary emotions is achieved by implementing five of Ekman’s six “basic emo-
tions”. In addition, the emotions “bored”, “annoyed”, and “depressed” as well
as the non-emotional state “concentrated” are simulated. Each of the primary
emotions is located in PAD space according to Table 1, for which the coordi-
nates are derived from some of the values given in [31, p. 286ff]. The seven facial
Fig. 1. The nine primary emotions of Table 1 as points together with the three sec-
ondary emotions of Table 2 as weighted areas in PAD space
expressions of MAX corresponding to the eight primary emotions and the neu-
tral state “concentrated” (cf. Table 1) are shown in Figure 1. In case of high
pleasure Ekman’s set of “basic emotions” [12] only contains one obviously posi-
tive emotion, namely happiness. Thus, in the presented implementation [5] this
primary emotion covers the whole area of positive pleasure regardless of arousal
or dominance as it is located in PAD space four times altogether.
3.2 Three Secondary Emotions
According to Damasio, the elicitation of secondary emotions involves a “thought
process”, in which the actual stimulus is evaluated against previously acquired
experiences and online generated expectations.
The “prospect-based emotions” cluster of the OCC-model of emotions [25] is
considered here to belong to the class of secondary emotions, because their ap-
praisal process includes the evaluation of events against experiences and expecta-
tions. This OCC-cluster consists of six emotions, of which hope, fears-confirmed,
and relief are simulated in the WASABI architecture.
Hope Ortony et al. describe hope as resulting from the appraisal of a prospective
event [25]. If the potential event is considered desirable for oneself, one is likely to
be “pleased about the prospect of a desirable event” [25, p. 110]. The calculation
of this emotion’s awareness likelihood, however, is rather independent from these
cognitive processes.
PE final Facial expr. (Ekman) PAD values base intensity ipe
1. angry anger (anger) (80, 80, 100) 0.75
2. annoyed sad (sadness) (-50, 0, 100) 0.75
3. bored bored (none) (0, -80, 100) 0.75
4. concentrated neutral (none) (0, 0, ±100) 0.75
5. depressed sad (sadness) (0, -80, -100) 0.75
6. fearful fear (fear) (-80, 80, 100) 0.25
7. happy happy (happiness) (80, 80, ±100)
(50, 0, ±100)
0.75
8. sad sad (sadness) (-50, 0, -100) 0.75
9. surprised surprised (surprise) (10, 80, ±100) 0.0
Table 1. Primary emotions in PAD space: The five “basic emotions” of [11] are assigned
to the corresponding facial expressions modeled in [2] whenever such a mapping is
possible (cp. Figure 1) and additionally an individual base intensity ipe is set for each
primary emotion (see also Section 3.3)
The previous analysis provides the rationale for modeling hope in the follow-
ing way:
– Pleasure: The awareness likelihood of hope increases the more pleasurable
the agent feels.
– Arousal: With respect to an agent’s arousal, hope is more likely elicited the
higher the agent’s arousal value.
– Dominance: The awareness likelihood of hope is modeled to be independent
of the agent’s general level of dominance.
To realize this distribution of awareness likelihood in case of hope, two areas are
introduced in Figure 1, one in the high dominance plane and the other in the
low dominance plane. In Table 2 the exact values of the four corners of each of
the two areas together with the respective base intensity in each corner is given
for hope.
Fears-confirmed According to Ortony et al., fears-confirmed is elicited when
being “displeased about the confirmation of the prospect of an undesirable
event.” [25, p. 110] With respect to its representation in PAD space the sim-
ilarity to the primary emotion fearful is taken into account and the following
decisions are taken:
– Pleasure: The awareness likelihood of fears-confirmed increases the less plea-
surable the agent feels.
– Arousal: fears-confirmed is considered to be independent from the agent’s
arousal value.
– Dominance: fears-confirmed can only be perceived by the agent, when he
feels submissive as in the case of fearful.
This distribution of awareness likelihood is realized in PAD space (cf. Figure 1)
by introducing an area in the low dominance plane (cf. Table 2 for the exact
coordinates and intensities).
Area (PAD values), intensity
HOPE
high dominance (100, 0, 100), 0.6; (100, 100, 100), 1.0;
(-100, 100, 100), 0.5; (-100, 0, 100), 0.1
low dominance (100, 0, -100), 0.6; (100, 100, -100), 1.0;
(-100, 100, -100), 0.5; (-100, 0, -100), 0.1
FEARS-CONFIRMED
low dominance (-100, 100, -100), 1.0; (0, 100, -100), 0.0;
(0, -100, -100), 0.0; (-100, -100, -100), 1.0
RELIEF
high dominance (100, 0, 100), 1.0; (100, 50, 100), 1.0;
(-100, 50, 100), 0.2; (-100, 0, 100), 0.2
low dominance (100, 0, -100), 1.0; (100, 50, -100), 1.0;
(-100, 50, -100), 0.2; (-100, 0, -100), 0.2
Table 2. The parameters of the secondary emotions hope, fears-confirmed, and relief
for representation in PAD space
Relief The secondary emotion relief is described as being experienced when-
ever one is “pleased about the disconfirmation of the prospect of an undesirable
event.” [25, p. 110] Taking the similarity with Gehm and Scherer’s “content”
cluster into account [17], relief is represented in PAD space according to the
following considerations:
– Pleasure: relief is more likely to become aware the more pleasurable the
agent feels.
– Arousal: Only in case of relatively low arousal levels the agent is assumed to
get aware of the emotion relief.
– Dominance: The awareness likelihood of relief is considered to be indepen-
dent from the agent’s state of dominance.
The awareness likelihood is represented in Figure 1 by two areas, one located in
the high dominance plane and the other in the low dominance plane (cf. Table 2).
3.3 Emotion Dynamics and Awareness Likelihood
The implementation of emotion dynamics is based on the assumption that an or-
ganisms natural, homeostatic state is characterized by emotional balance, which
accompanies an agent’s normal level of cognitive processing [36]. Whenever an
emotionally relevant internal or external stimulus is detected, however, its va-
lence component serves as an emotional impulse, which disturbs the homeostasis
causing certain levels of pleasure and arousal in the emotion module. Further-
more, a dynamic process is started by which these values are continuously driven
back to the state of balance (see [3] for details).
The two valences are mathematically mapped into PAD space (cf. Figure 1)
and combined with the actual level of Dominance, which is derived from the
situational context in the cognition of the architecture. This process results in
a course of a reference point in PAD space representing the continuously chang-
ing, bodily feeling state from which the awareness likelihood of primary and
secondary emotions is derived with an update rate of 25Hz (see also [4, 6]).
Awareness likelihood of primary emotions The awareness likelihood of
any of the nine primary emotions pe (cf. Table 1) increases the smaller the
distance between the actual PAD values and the primary emotion’s PAD values
(i.e. dpe in Equation 1). When dpe falls below Φpe units for a particular primary
emotion pe, the calculation of its awareness likelihood wpe is started according
to Equation 1 until dpe falls below ∆pe units in which case the likelihood is wpe
equals the primary emotion’s base intensity ipe.
wpe = (1−
dpe −∆pe
Φpe −∆pe
) · ipe, with Φpe > ∆pe ∀pe ∈ {pe1, . . . , pe9} (1)
In Equation 1, Φpe can be interpreted as the activation threshold and ∆pe as the
saturation threshold, which can be adjusted for every primary emotion pen ∈
{pe1, . . . , pe9} independently3. By setting a primary emotion’s base intensity ipe
to 0.0 (as in the case of surprised, cf. Table 1) it needs to be triggered by the
cognition before it might gain a non-zero awareness likelihood wpe.
In case of primary emotions that are represented in PAD space more than
once (i.e. concentrated, happy, and surprised; cf. Table 1) the representation
with the minimum distance to the reference point is considered in Equation 1
for calculation of its awareness likelihood.
Awareness likelihood of secondary emotions With representing the three
secondary emotions in PAD space their mood-congruent elicitation can be as-
sured, because the actual PAD values are also relevant for calculating every sec-
ondary emotion’s awareness likelihood. In contrast to most primary emotions,
all secondary emotion’s base intensities are set to zero by default (cp. the case
of surprised above).
Accordingly, every secondary emotion has first to be triggered by a cognitive
process, before it gains the potential to get aware to the agent. Furthermore, a
secondary emotion’s lifetime parameter (set to 10.0 by default) together with its
decay function (set to linear by default) are used to decrease its intensity over
time until its base intensity of zero is reached again.
In the Skip-Bo card game scenario [6], for example, Max might believe that
the opponent may play a card hindering him to fulfill one of his goals and
the expectation of an undesirable event is generated. Later, upon perceiving
and interpreting the opponent’s actions, Max might realize that the opponent
fulfilled the expectation by playing that undesired card. In result the secondary
emotion fears-confirmed is triggered and, at the same time, a negative emotional
impulse is sent to the emotion dynamics. If the corresponding PAD values fall
into the fears-confirmed region (cf. Figure 1), Max will get aware that his fears
3 The nine primary emotions are indexed according to Table 1.
are confirmed with a likelihood that results from linear interpolation between
the current intensities in the four corners of the fears-confirmed area at the
location given by the actual PAD values. Currently, each non-zero likelihood
of a secondary emotion lets MAX produce an appropriate verbal expression
(cf. Figure 2(a) and Figure 2(b)).
(a) MAX expresses his hope that the human player
will play the card with the number seven next by
saying “Kannst Du nicht die 7 spielen?” (Can’t
you play the seven?)
(b) MAX realizes that his fears
just got confirmed and utters “Das
hatte ich schon befrchtet!” (I was
already afraid of that!)
Fig. 2. MAX expressing his hope and realizing that his fears got confirmed
3.4 Connecting Cognition and Embodiment
In Figure 3 the conceptual distinction of an agent’s simulated embodiment and
its cognition is presented and the different modules and components of the
WASABI architecture are assigned to the corresponding layers.
To the left of Figure 3 the virtual human MAX perceives some (internal
or external) stimulus. Non-conscious appraisal is realized by directly sending a
small positive emotional impulse to the Emotion dynamics component of the
WASABI architecture. This establishes the “low road” [20] of primary emotion
elicitation. For example, the presence of visitors in the museum [2] is interpreted
as intrinsically pleasant following the ideas of Scherer [34].
Another path resulting in emotional impulses begins with conscious appraisal
of the perceived stimulus (cf. Figure 3, top left). This process resides in the
Cognition, because it is based on the evaluation of goal-conduciveness of an
event [34] and can be considered the “high road” of emotion elicitation [20].
Therefore, MAX exploits his BDI-based cognitive reasoning abilities to update
his memory and generate expectations. These deliberative processes not only
Fig. 3. The conceptual distinction of cognition and embodiment in the WASABI ar-
chitecture
enable MAX to derive his subjective level of Dominance from the situational
and social context, but also propose cognitively plausible secondary emotions.
These secondary emotions are, however, first filtered in PAD space, before
MAX might get aware of them (cf. Figure 3, middle). Independent of this
“awareness filter”, every cognitively plausible secondary emotion influences the
Emotion dynamics component of the WASABI architecture, thereby modulat-
ing MAX’s Pleasure and Arousal values, i.e. his simulated Embodiment. This
influence is achieved by interpreting the valence component of any secondary
emotion as an emotional impulse (cf. Figure 3, left). This way, secondary emo-
tions “utilize the machinery of primary emotions” [9], because they might result
in the elicitation of mood-congruent primary emotions, which—in the WASABI
architecture—drive MAX’s facial expressions involuntarily. Furthermore, as the
Pleasure and Arousal values are incessantly modulating MAX’s involuntary be-
haviors (i.e. breathing and eye blinking) as well, even “unaware” secondary emo-
tions have an effect on MAX’s bodily state and involuntary behavior.
In combination with the actual level of Dominance, primary emotions are
elicited by means of a distance metric in PAD space. As mentioned before, these
primary emotions are directly driving MAX’s facial expressions. Although this
automatism might be considered unnatural for an adult, it has proven applicable
and believable in the situational contexts in which MAX was integrated so far.
After the awareness filter has been applied, the resulting set of aware emo-
tions consists of primary and secondary emotions together with their respective
awareness likelihoods. They are finally subject to further deliberation and reap-
praisal resulting in different coping behaviors. In the card game scenario the
direct vocal and facial expression of negative emotions is sufficient to let the
human players play in accordance with the rules.
4 Discussion and Conclusion
We presented the WASABI architecture for mood-congruent simulation of pri-
mary and secondary emotions as it is integrated in, and makes use of, the overall
cognitive architecture of our Virtual Human MAX. The simulation and direct
expression of primary emotions is based on the idea to capture an agent’s bod-
ily feeling state as a continuous progression in three-dimensional emotion space
(i.e. PAD space), which is only subsequently translated into weighted, primary
emotions. Secondary emotions, in contrast, are understood as onto-genetically
later types of emotions, which require higher cognitive reasoning abilities and
a certain sense of time, in that an agent has to be able to take experiences
and expectations into account to generate prospect-based emotions. To also as-
sure mood-congruency of secondary emotions, we roughly capture aspects of
their connotative meanings in PAD space as well by introducing weighted areas.
Furthermore, to account for the decisive influence of cognitive processes in the
elicitation of secondary emotions, they can only gain a certain awareness likeli-
hood in PAD space of the embodiment, after having been triggered by cognitive
processes.
Although our approach has not yet been subject to an extended evaluation,
some empirical evidence on the effect of secondary emotion simulation could
already be gathered. A total of 23 participants played Skip-Bo either against
MAX only simulating and expressing primary emotions (similar to the negative
empathic condition in [28], n=11) or against MAX additionally simulating and
verbally expressing secondary emotions (cf. Figure 2, n=12). As a result, MAX
with primary and secondary emotions “in concert” was judged significantly older
(mean value 27,5 years, standard deviation 7.5) than MAX with simulated pri-
mary emotions alone (mean value 19,8 years, standard deviation 7.7)4.
In summary, we believe that the WASABI architecture is a helpful model to
understand how the dynamic interplay of a human’s body and mind together
with his past experiences and future expectations sometimes turns “cold” cog-
nitions into “hot” affective states.
4 A two-tailed t-test assuming unequal variances results in p = 0.025. No significant
effect of the participants’ gender could be found.
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